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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Problem: Compulsory Collection and Retention of DNA Upon Arrest   
 The following scenario, though a hypothetical, could be happening all over 
the United States because of the current DNA Act.  John is arrested by the township 
police department on a burglary charge.  Upon arrest, the police obtain a sample of 
John’s DNA using a buccal swab.  John does not give his consent for the sample nor 
do police obtain a warrant from the local magistrate.  The charges against John are 
later dropped.  John’s DNA profile is entered into the local DNA database and also 
entered into CODIS, the federal DNA database.  John is unaware his DNA was kept.  
He never writes to have his profile expunged from the record.  A few years later 
there is a murder in John’s town.  Federal officials are called in to investigate the 
murder.  The federal agents obtain DNA from the crime scene.  The DNA sample is 
entered into the national database and alerts officials that John’s sample is a partial 
match.  Officials now know that the person who committed the murder is a male 
relative of John.  Police go to John’s town and use the partial match as probable 
cause to arrest all of John’s male relatives in the area.  Using the authority of the 
federal DNA Act, the federal agents obtain compulsory DNA samples of all the male 
relatives upon their arrest for the murder.  John’s cousin, Mark, is a direct match.  
Mark is charged with the murder.1  
 Some people may read the preceding hypothetical and think, “Great, police 
were able to solve that murder.”  But others will read that scenario and shudder 
                                                        
1 DNA and Law Enforcement; Karen J. Maschke; 2-3; published by the Hastings 
Center 
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because the DNA Act and the compulsory collection and retention of DNA from 
arrested individuals bypasses the protections of the Fourth Amendment and reeks 
of an unconstitutional search and seizure.   
DNA Databases 
The United States currently has the largest DNA database in the world.2  Until 
a few years ago, the United Kingdom had the largest.  As of 2012, 53 countries have 
established DNA databases.3  Six countries have enacted legislation establishing 
DNA databases.4  Three countries are considering legislation to establish DNA 
databases.  Thirty-five countries are in the process of planning DNA databases.5  The 
United Arab Emirates is in the process of putting the entire population into a DNA 
database.6  In 2008, Uzbekistan declared it would put its entire population into a 
DNA database.7  US intelligence is currently building DNA databases in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.8  Bermuda has been entering DNA profiles into its national database since 
2005, including the profiles of innocent people.9  In Argentina, families whose 
children went missing during the dictatorship have been voluntarily giving DNA 
samples to the national database.10  Based on the statistics, it is clear that DNA 
profiling is here to stay.   
 
                                                        
2 Gene Watch UK; www.genewatch.org 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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II. Current DNA Collection and Retention Policies  
The United States  
DNA profiling has become so popular because it is a simple and accurate method 
for identification.  In the United States, DNA profiling was first used to convict a 
criminal defendant in 1987 when forensic scientist recovered a DNA sample from a 
Florida rape victim to the DNA of the suspect.11 
Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135 
in 2000.  The statute authorized federal officials to collect DNA samples from people 
convicted of specific violent crimes who were in federal custody, including 
probationers, parolees, and people on supervised release.  In 2004 Congress passed 
the Justice for All Act, which expanded DNA collection to any person convicted of 
any federal felony.   Congress further expanded DNA legislation with the passage of 
the Violence Against Women Act of 2006 and the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006.  These acts permit federal officials to obtain DNA from any person 
arrested for a federal felony and federal detainees who are neither US citizens nor 
permanent resident aliens.12  
                                                        
11 Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued 
Seizure Under the DNA Act, Natalie Logan; page 2 
12 DNA and Law Enforcement; Karen J. Maschke; 2-3; published by the Hastings 
Center 
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On July 27, 2006 the new amendments to 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a became 
effective.13   The amendments authorized DNA samples to be collected “from 
individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted or from non-United States 
persons who are detained under the authority of the United States.”14   The statute 
states that “any felony” is any qualifying federal offense for purposes of the Act.15   
The Act proscribes a criminal penalty for individuals who fail to cooperate in the 
collection of samples – failure to comply will result in the individual being guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor and punished in accordance with Title 18.16  
The DNA Act requires the Attorney General, the Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons, or the corresponding probation office to give every DNA sample taken 
pursuant to (a) to the Director of the FBI.  The FBI will then analyze each sample and 
create a DNA profile.17   State and federal agencies submit locally analyzed DNA 
profiles to the National DNA Index System (NDIS).  The FBI uses its software 
program, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to link the profiles already 
contained in the state and federal databases.18  
There are safeguards built into the statute and government policies that protect 
the genetic information and limit the reach of the Act.  First, the Act requires the 
Director of the FBI to expunge the DNA record from CODIS when a conviction is 
overturned or when, if the sample is taken following an arrest, the charge is 
                                                        
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(a) 
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(a)(1)(A) 
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(d)(1) 
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(a)(5)(A) and (B)    
17 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(b) 
18 Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued 
Seizure Under the DNA Act, Natalie Logan; page 3 
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dismissed or results in an acquittal or no charge is timely filed.19  In order for the 
FBI to expunge the record, the individual must send a certified copy of the final 
court order establishing the final disposition of the arrest or conviction.20  
There are two additional government policies that are not explicitly part of the 
statute but are important in protecting against the misuse of information.  First, 
there are no names or other personal identifiers stored in CODIS.  The database 
contains only the DNA profile, a number identifying the agency that submitted the 
DNA profile, a “Specimen Identification Number” (a number the FBI assigned 
sequentially at the time the sample is collected that does not correspond in any way 
to the individual’s social security number, criminal history identifier, or correctional 
facility identifier), and information identifying the laboratory personnel associated 
with creating the profile.21   The end result is that a CODIS user can only access a 
very limited amount of data, none of which can be used to identify the source of the 
DNA profile.22   
Second, the FBI has established a policy of using only “junk DNA.”  Junk DNA 
refers to “non-genic stretches of DNA not presently recognized as being responsible 
for trait coding.”23  The strict practice of analyzing and storing only “junk DNA” 
                                                        
19 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135 
20United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011); 42 U.S.C.A. § 
14135(d)(1)(A) 
21  http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet 
22 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011) 
23 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality 
opinion) 
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guarantees that important personal genetic information that reveals physical 
characteristics and medical conditions is not stored in CODIS.24  
Compulsory DNA Collection and the Fourth Amendment   
 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”25   A 
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government infringes upon an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.26   “It is 
undisputed that a compelled DNA extraction is a “search” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.”27   “The compulsory extraction of blood for DNA profiling unquestionably 
implicates the right to personal security embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and 
thus constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Constitution.”28  
Compulsory DNA collection pursuant to the Act implicates the Fourth 
Amendment in three different ways.29  First, the collection of the sample is a search 
of the person.30  Law enforcement can take DNA be using a blood sample or buccal 
swab of the interior of the individual’s cheek.31  Although this is a minimal intrusion, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that even minimal intrusions implicate the 
                                                        
24 United States v. Mitchell, at 400 
25 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4 
26 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4 
27 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) 
28 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)   
29Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 612 (1989) 
30 Id.  
31 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010) 
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Fourth Amendment.32  Second, the collection of the sample is a seizure of the 
individual’s bodily tissues.33   Third, the analysis of the sample is a second, separate 
search.34 The federal Circuit Courts have “unanimously upheld the analysis of DNA 
samples as searches for Fourth Amendment purposes” but have declined to find the 
analysis unreasonable.35   
Currently, the majority of United States Circuit Courts views the collection of 
DNA as parallel to the collection of a fingerprint and have held the compulsory 
collection and retention of DNA upon arrest does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  The majority view is to analyze the constitutionality of the Act using a 
reasonableness approach: whether the intrusion is reasonable.36   The courts apply 
a totality of circumstances test, “balancing the intrusion on an arrestee’s privacy 
against the Government’s interest in the collection and testing of his DNA.”37 For 
example, in Mitchell, the Third Circuit weighed the minimal intrusion of the buccal 
swab combined with an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy in his identity 
against “the protections built into the Act, the Government’s stated practice of only 
analyzing ‘junk DNA’, the current limits of technology, the information stored served 
only an identification purpose, the DNA served important law enforcement interests 
which were not equally well served by collecting DNA samples post conviction” and 
                                                        
32 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1989) 
33 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004)   
34 Skinner v. United States, 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 1402, 616 (1989)   
35 Logan, page 12 
36 Haskell v. Harris (9th Cir.) (Analyzing CA statute comparable to DNA Act); United 
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011) 
37 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 
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determined the intrusion was reasonable and therefore not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.38   
The FBI’s policy of using only “junk DNA” ensures that the CODIS DNA profiles 
can only be used for identification.  In Mitchell, the Third Circuit found “the use of 
“junk DNA” creates a “DNA fingerprint” that yields precise information about 
identity but little or no other personal information.”39  The D.C. Circuit Court 
determined that because junk DNA is useful for only identification purposes, “CODIS 
functions much like an old-fashioned fingerprint database (albeit more 
efficiently).”40  See also Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2010), stating 
that, “Given the DNA Act’s stringent limitations on the creation and use of DNA 
profiles, CODIS currently functions much like a traditional fingerprint database, 
permitting law enforcement to match one identification record against others 
contained in the database.”41  Both the Second and Tenth Circuits also determined 
the DNA Act’s restrictions and FBI’s use of junk DNA in CODIS permit the 
government to use a suspect’s DNA in essentially the same way the government uses 
fingerprints and photographs to identify suspects and solve past and future 
crimes.42  Because courts view DNA profiles as analogous to fingerprint records, 
courts treat the intrusion of privacy under the DNA Act to be similar to the intrusion 
caused by the retention of fingerprint records.43  
                                                        
38 Id. 
39 United States v. Mitchell, at 401 
40 Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C.Cir.2006) 
41 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2010) 
42 Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir.2007) 
43 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir.2005)     
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DNA Retention and the Fourth Amendment  
 DNA Retention Not an Unreasonable Search  
Currently, the United States Supreme Court has not faced the question as to 
whether the retention of DNA samples or profiles is a constitutional violation.  
Boroian v. Mueller, a First Circuit decision, was the first decision regarding the 
government’s retention of the sample in CODIS.44   In Boroian, the First Circuit held 
the government’s retention of Boroian’s (a former probationer) blood sample and 
DNA profile pursuant to the DNA Act did not constitute a separate “search” in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court based its decision on the fact that the 
matching process used by CODIS was not a new search because it was limited to a 
comparison of the identification records already in the government’s lawful 
possession.  Furthermore, subsequent CODIS searches for matches did not reveal 
any new private information about Boroian or intrude in any way on his reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  Therefore, the subsequent searches were not treated as 
new “searches” for Fourth Amendment purposes.45  
The federal courts’ treatment of DNA profiles as analogous to fingerprints (for 
identification purposes only) lead the First Circuit to determine that DNA profiles 
fall under the 28 U.S.C. § 534(a), which requires the Attorney General to “acquire, 
collect, classify, and preserve” criminal identification records.46  The government is 
not required to expunge the records, except for in very limited circumstances.  (“It is 
                                                        
44 Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued 
Seizure Under the DNA Act; Natalie Logan, 2012, Trustees of Boston University; 
Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60 (1st Cir.) 
45 Id.  
46 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d at 67 
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well established that the state need not destroy records of identification – such as 
fingerprints, photographs, etc. – of convicted felons, once their sentences are up.”)47 
DNA Retention: Question of Continued Seizure  
 Boroian’s claim, that the retention of his DNA sample was an unreasonable 
search, failed.48  However, on his appeal to the First Circuit, Boroian attempted to 
raise the allegation that the DNA Act was unconstitutional because it constituted a 
continued seizure, and was thus an unreasonable search.49  The United States 
Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of continuing seizure in United States v. 
Place.  The Court determined that a seizure of personal property could be 
reasonable on the onset but the continuing seizure could become unreasonable 
because of the length of time the property was held for.50  However, when Boroian’s 
case reach the First Circuit on appeal, the Court refused to address the new 
complaint because Boroian had failed to raise the issue on his appeal to the lower 
court. 51   
 The Continuous Seizure Doctrine is relevant to the DNA Act because it raises 
the important (and as yet unanswered question) of whether a person retains a 
possessory interest in his DNA after it has been taken by the government, profile, 
and entered into CODIS to be used in future DNA searches.52  The Supreme Court 
has not addressed the question of whether a person retains a possessory interest in 
                                                        
47 United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007) 
48 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60 
49 Boroian v. Mueller, supra  
50 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2639, 77 L.Ed. 2d 110 
(1983) 
51 Boroian v. Mueller, supra   
52 Logan, page 748 - 749 
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his DNA sample once it has been collected.53  However, the leading state court case 
in possessory rights of biological matter, Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California, held that a person does not retain a property right in human tissue and 
biological matter that has been removed from his body.54  Based on this decision, as 
well as the current trend in treating DNA samples and profiles on CODIS as 
comparable to a fingerprint database, my guess would be there would be no claim 
for maintaining a possessory interest in the blood or buccal swab that was removed 
from the body and used to create the DNA profile.   
DNA Collection Has No Fifth Amendment Implications  
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a person 
will not “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”55  The 
compulsory collection of DNA samples does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.  
When a person is compelled to give a DNA sample, the sample is collected either 
through blood or a buccal swab of the inner cheek of the suspect (to collect saliva).    
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court ruled that physical 
characteristics are not subject to the self-incrimination clause and therefore the 
compulsory taking of the defendant’s blood was not a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.56  The Court has developed this concept over the years and ruled there 
are a number of situations where defendants and suspects are forced to provide 
physical information and there is no Fifth Amendment violation.  See Pennsylvania 
v. Muniz, holding defendant’s answers to officers’ questions pursuant to a DUI stop 
                                                        
53 Logan, page 749 
54 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990) 
55 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5 
56 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.D. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) 
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prior to being given his Miranda warnings were admissible because slurred speech 
was a physical characteristic of the defendant and not “testimonial” and therefore 
not protected by the Fifth Amendment.57  See also Gilbert v. California, holding a 
mere handwriting sample (as opposed to the content of what is written), is like the 
voice or body itself, an identifying physical characteristic, and not subject to 
constitutional protection.58  Based on the case law, the DNA Act relates to physical 
characteristics and therefore is entirely constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.   
Current Status of the DNA Act in the US 
 Every United States Circuit Court that has addressed the constitutionality of 
the DNA Act as applied to arrestees not yet convicted has upheld the Act as 
constitutional.  However, on April 24, 2012 the Maryland Court of Appeals 
overturned the 2010 conviction and life sentence of Alonzo Jay King.  King had been 
arrested for an assault in 2009.  Upon his arrest, authorities took a DNA sample 
pursuant to a Maryland state law permitting police to obtain DNA samples from 
people arrested for violent crimes, attempted violent crimes, burglary, and 
attempted burglary.  The DNA sample linked King to a rape that had gone unsolved 
for seven years.  The Maryland Court of Appeals held Maryland’s DNA Collection Act 
was a violation to the Fourth Amendment because it constituted an unreasonable 
search and seizure.59   
 Maryland applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.  On 
November 9, 2012 the High Court granted certiorari to determine whether a state 
                                                        
57 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990) 
58 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967) 
59 “Supreme Court Takes Up DNA and Sentencing Cases” MSNBC; 11/09/2012; 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/49765575/ns/us_news 
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may collect DNA samples from arrestees not yet convicted of violent crimes.  Chief 
Justice Roberts noted the Maryland Court’s decision conflicts with three other 
appellate courts that upheld DNA laws similar to Maryland’s.  Roberts said 
Maryland’s decision “had national implications” because if the Maryland decision 
was upheld the FBI could not get Maryland arrestees’ samples for CODIS.60   
Council Of Europe Member States   
Introduction 
The United Kingdom was the first European country to establish a national DNA 
database.  Currently, most of the Council of Europe member States have established 
databases and permit the compulsory collection of DNA in the criminal context.  
Twenty-five States have provisions permitting the collection of DNA samples to be 
stored as a profile on a DNA database (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden).61 
DNA policies in the member States vary.  Most countries do not permit automatic 
DNA collection in criminal proceedings but restrict sampling and profiling to 
specific circumstances, such as arrests for serious offenses or crimes punishable by 
certain prison terms (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden).62  Five 
                                                        
60 Id.  
61 Gene Watch UK; Summary by Region: Europe; http://www.genewatch.org/sub-
568625; accessed 10/26/2012 
62 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/echr-marper-judgments.pdf 
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countries (Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Sweden) permit DNA samples to be 
obtained and profiles entered into the national database but require that the 
information be destroyed pursuant to a government order if the person is acquitted 
or criminal proceedings are not pursued.63 
Some countries permit retention for a limited time or for limited purposes.  For 
example, Austria and Poland allow DNA profiles to be kept if there is a real risk the 
individual will commit a future dangerous offense.64  Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands authorize retention if the police continue to suspect the person or if the 
person is implicated in a separate criminal investigation.65  While the UK is the only 
member State that once permitted indefinite retention, France has a very expansive 
retention policy: profiles can be kept for 25 years after the person is acquitted or 
charges dismissed.66  However, during the retention period the prosecutor can 
order the profile be deleted (either on his own or upon request) if the DNA is no 
longer required for identification in a criminal prosecution.67  Finland permits 
retention for one year after a person is acquittal.68  Denmark law authorizes profile 
retention for 10 years after an acquittal.69  Switzerland permits DNA to be kept for 1 
year after criminal proceedings are discontinued.70  
                                                        
63 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/echr-marper-judgments.pdf 
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
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Italy has a very restrictive DNA policy.   In June 2009 Italy passed legislation 
establishing a database for convicted offenders only.  To obtain a DNA sample from 
a suspect, a judge must request the person’s profile.71 
The United Kingdom 
Until recently, the United Kingdom had the largest DNA database in the world.  
The database, officially titled the UK National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database 
(NDNAD), was established in 1995.  By March 2012 the database contained about 
5,950,612 individual profiles.  Approximately 30,000 new profiles are added to the 
database each month.  The DNA samples are taken from crime scenes, police 
suspects, and, in England and Wales, from anyone arrested and detained at a police 
station.  The current database has matched 400,000 crime scene DNA samples.72  
The main reason the UK database is so large is because once a profile is entered 
into the database in cannot be removed, even if the person is acquitted or the 
charges dropped.73  As of 2004, any person arrested in England and Wales for any 
recordable offense (regardless of their age) has their DNA taken.  The profile 
remains in the database permanently; the nature of the offense, the age of the 
offender, and acquittal or conviction are irrelevant.74  Currently, the database 
                                                        
71 Id.   
72 BBC News: “Time Limits on Innocent DNA Data”; BBC News; May 7, 2009; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8037042.stm 
73 BBC News: “All UK Must Be On Database”; published 2007/09/05; accessed 
10/01/12; from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/uk_news/6979138.stm; copyright BBC 2012 
74 Id. 
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contains 24,000 profiles of people aged 10-17 who were arrested and charged but 
never convicted of a crime.75   
The Data Protection Act of 1998 
 On October 24, 1995 the European Convention on Human Rights issued 
Directive 95/46/EC.  The Directive’s purpose was to protect the privacy of 
individuals (under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights) by 
restricting the processing of individual personal data and limit the sharing of that 
data.  The Directive enumerates policies and principles to restrict the processing 
and use of personal data while permitting individual Member States to enact 
legislation to ensure personal data is used for the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offenses.76  
 On July 16, 1998 the United Kingdom adopted the Data Protection Act to 
effectuate the purpose of the Council’s Directive.  The Act states that the processing 
of personal data (“data which relate to a living individual who can be identified) is 
subjected to eight data protection measures.  The first principle requires that 
personal data “shall be processed fairly and lawfully.”77  Pursuant to the Act, 
personal data processed for the prevention or detection of crime is excluded from 
the first principle’s requirements.78  The fifth principle of the Act orders that 
personal data processed for any purpose or purposes should not be kept for longer 
                                                        
75 Id. 
76 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/echr-marper-judgment.html  
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
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than is necessary for that purpose.  The Act makes it a criminal offense not to 
comply with the protective and restrictive measures contained therein.79 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland   
In England and Wales, the Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 authorizes the 
entry of DNA profiles of persons charged with any recordable offense or who are 
convicted of any such offense.80  All DNA profiles collected from crime scenes are 
also stored in the NDNAD.81   The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 
permitted officers to take “non-intimate” samples from suspects without permission 
from the individual (for example: hair shafts).82  The Justice and Public Order Act 
changed the definition of non-intimate samples to include buccal swabs, therefore 
greatly expanding police sampling powers.83  The statute applies to both convicted 
offenders and persons arrested or charged with an offense.  Additionally, officers 
are authorized to collect DNA samples from minors (who are at least 10 years old) 
and from mentally ill people.84  The Act imposes no restrictions on the collection of 
samples from crime scenes.85 
 The Criminal Justice and Police of Act of 2001 authorizes the government to 
indefinitely retain the DNA profiles of both suspects and arrestees and convicted 
offenders.  DNA profiles of persons who are later acquitted or whose charges are 
                                                        
79 Id.  
80 www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/dnadata/Countries/GB.html; “United 
Kingdom”’ accessed 11/07/12 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
 20 
dropped are also kept indefinitely on the database.  DNA profiles generated from 
samples obtained from crime scenes are stored until identified or a match is found.86 
The inability of persons to remove their DNA profiles from the UK database has 
sparked international criticism.  Home Office Minister Tony McNulty defends the 
database, stating the database has assisted police in solving about 20,000 crimes a 
year.87  McNulty also said that although there are currently no plans to introduce 
DNA collection and profiling for all UK citizens, “no one ever said never.”88  Lord 
Justice Sedley, an experienced and respected appellate court judge in England, 
publicly criticized the system, stating, “We have a situation where if you happen to 
have been in the hands of the police then your DNA is on permanent record.  If you 
haven’t, it isn’t.”89  Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police and Chairman of the DNA 
Board, Tony Lake, stated DNA profiles from those convicted or arrested for violent 
or sexual offenses should stay on the database for life, but he does not think that 
needs to be the process for minor offenses.90 
Management of the National UK DNA Database   
Beginning in 1995 the Chief Scientist of the Forensic Science Service was 
responsible for management of the National DNA Database.91  In July of 2005 the 
management of the database was transferred to the Home Office, who then 
transferred custodianship to the National Policing Improvement Agency.92   
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Scotland  
 In Scotland, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1995 permits the entry of DNA 
profiles from those individuals arrested for any recordable offense or who are 
convicted of any such offense.93  DNA profiles derived from samples collected from 
crime scenes are also stored in the national database.94  A police officer may request 
or use reasonable force to obtain a buccal swab from any person arrested for any 
recordable offense.95  Officers may also request or forcibly take samples from 
minors (at least 10 years old) or from mentally ill persons.96  As in England, there 
are no restrictions on collecting DNA samples from crime scenes.97   Convicted 
persons’ DNA profiles are kept indefinitely on the database.98  If an arrested person 
is acquitted or, as soon as the decision is made not to initiate or pursue criminal 
proceedings against an arrestee, the arrestee’s sample must immediately be 
removed from the database.99  Samples collected from crime scenes are retained 
until identified but are not stored in the database until an identification of the 
sample is made.100      
 Scotland’s government may develop its own policies and procedures 
regarding the collection, treatment, and retention of DNA samples and profiles.  
However, Scotland’s DNA database is not completely separate from England’s and 
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Wales’s.  Scotland sends all its profiles to the NDNAD, meaning the national UK 
database contains almost all of the UK profiles.101 
Challenges to DNA Retention in the UK: S and Marper  
 The United Kingdom is a member nation of the Council of Europe and 
therefore is subject to the rights granted by Section 1, Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.102  Section 8 guarantees that 1)“Everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”, and 2) 
“There shall be no interference by a pubic authority with the exercise of this right 
except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”103 
 On August 16, 2004, two British citizens, Mr. Michael Marper, and “S” 
(request made by applicant not to have his name disclosed was granted by the 
court) brought two separate applications against the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland alleging violations under Article 34 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.104  S had been 
arrested on January 19, 2001 at the age of 11 and charged with attempted robbery.  
His fingerprints and DNA sample were taken pursuant to the Police and Criminal 
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Evidence Act.  On June 14, 2001 S was acquitted of the crime but his DNA profile 
remained on the UK national database.   
Mr. Marper was arrested on March 13, 2001 and charged with harassment.  
At the time of his arrest his DNA and fingerprints were taken.  No charges were ever 
pressed and criminal proceedings were never initiated.105  His DNA profile 
remained on the database.  
 Both S and Marper asked for their fingerprints and DNA to be destroyed but 
police refused in both cases.  S and Marper applied for judicial review of the officers’ 
decisions not to destroy the samples.  On March 22, 2012, the Administrative Court 
denied the applications.  S and Marper appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, 
which, on September 12, 2002, upheld the Administrative Court’s decision.  Lord 
Justice Walker (of the Court of Appeal) used a balancing test to determine whether 
the DNA samples should be retained.  He found that the risks in keeping genetic 
material were outweighed by the benefits in achieving the UK’s goals of prosecuting 
and preventing crime.106  
 On July 22, 2004 the House of Lords dismissed an appeal brought by S and 
Marper.  The House first noted past examples where a murderer and a rapist had 
either been acquitted of charges or a decision not to proceed with criminal 
proceedings had been made because DNA evidence linking the defendants to the 
crimes had not been able to be used.  The House went on to cite a 1999 case where 
DNA evidence from “T” was used to link “T” to a rape, even though that DNA 
evidence should have been destroyed (under the earlier provisions of the Police and 
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Criminal Evidence Act).  Additionally, the House referenced statistical evidence 
where 53 murders, 33 attempted murders, 94 rapes, 38 sexual offenses, 63 
aggravated burglaries and 56 cases involving drug distribution were linked to DNA 
profiles that would have been destroyed under the earlier version of the Act.107   
In applying the balancing test, the House of Lords concluded that the 
retention of fingerprints and DNA samples did not constitute an interference with 
the right to respect for private life, but that even if there was an interference it was 
“modest indeed.”108  The judges noted that the modest interference was justified by 
the purpose of retaining DNA profiles: the prevention of future crime and the right 
of other citizens to be free from crime.109  In response to S’s and Marper’s argument 
that retention of their DNA profiles on the database without a conviction “created 
suspicion in respect of persons who had been acquitted”,  the Home Secretary 
argued that retention of DNA “had nothing to do with the past” (the offense the 
person was acquitted for) but retention was to aid officers in their investigations of 
future crimes.110  The applicants, and other similarly situated, would only be 
impacted by the retention of their profiles if their profiles were a match for samples 
found at a future crime scene.  The House of Lords determined retention of DNA 
profiles provided law enforcement with an enormous benefit and did not create a 
privacy intrusion under Article 8.111 
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S and Marper brought their case before the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Grand Chamber.  Liberty and Privacy International, two non-governmental 
organizations, filed third-party briefs detailing the private nature of genetic material 
found in DNA samples.  Liberty called attention to the important rights granted 
under the Convention: that government interference with an individual’s rights 
must be “necessary in the democratic society” and have a legitimate goal of 
addressing a “pressing social need.”  Furthermore, the privacy interference must be 
in proportion to the goal and subject to the Court’s review and approval.112  S and 
Marper focused on the personal nature of the DNA samples along with their 
indefinite retention, stressing the data could be used to determine highly private 
information about medical conditions.  They further claimed the retention had 
negative psychological implications because it exposed them to a certain negative 
criminal stigma.113  
The UK government argued the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 
authorized the collection of the samples and retention of the profiles.  The 
government further alleged their activities did not fall within the purview of Article 
8 because it was used only as a means of accurate identification and did not reveal 
any personal information about the individuals.  The government stressed the 
important and legitimate goal of identifying future criminals as weighed against the 
minimal intrusion of collecting the samples.114 
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The 17-judge bench unanimously ruled that the retention of the DNA 
samples in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland was a violation of Article 8 and 
awarded 42,000 pounds each to S and Marper.   The Court stressed that the 
government interference with intimate details of individuals’ personal information 
is of the utmost importance to the individual.  The Court looked at how other 
Member States dealt with DNA collection and retention, focusing on Scotland.  The 
Court determined that Scotland had developed a rational and proportionate method 
for the DNA issue: indefinite retention for convicted individuals, destruction of 
samples and profiles for those acquitted or whose charges were dropped.  The 
judges decided that in dealing with issues such as this, where personal and 
important private information is at stake, Member States need to be given a narrow 
margin in how the individual states act.  In this case, the Court declared that the 
United Kingdom was outside the margin and indefinite retention did not achieve the 
proper balance.115 
United Kingdom Reaction to S and Marper  
 In May of 2009 the United Kingdom Home Office issued a declaration on how 
the UK would comply with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.  
According to the Court’s decision, the 850,000 DNA profiles on the database should 
be removed because indefinite retention was a violation of Article 8.  However, 
instead of removing the profiles the Home Office announced the following 
compliance measures:116     
- The destruction of all original DNA samples as soon as a profile is created 
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- After 12 years: Automatic deletion of profiles of those arrested for a 
violent or sexual crime but not convicted 
- After six years: Automatic deletion of profiles of those arrested but not 
convicted  
- Indefinite retention of DNA and fingerprints of anyone convicted of a 
recordable offense  
- Removal of juvenile’s profiles who were arrested but never convicted, or 
convicted of a minor offense, at the age of 18 
- Removal of DNA profiles for all children under 10 (already achieved at 
the time of the ruling) 
- Approximately 850,000 profiles are affected by the ruling and it would 
take up to two years to work through all the cases117  
 
Advocacy groups for individual rights alleged the UK’s compliance plan was an 
insult to the Court’s ruling that the database (excluding Scotland) was a violation of 
Article 8.  Government officials claimed the time limitations are enough to comply 
with the ruling but fear that with the cuts fewer crimes will be solved.118  Estimates 
range from 4500 fewer crimes being solved each year, with that number rising to 
26,000 if the retention policies are extended to fingerprint retention, which is the 
current plan.119   
Vernon Coaker, Home Office minister, stated that retention of DNA is a vital tool 
in solving future crimes because, according to current research, half of the 
individuals arrested and convicted reoffend within six years and two-thirds 
reoffend within 12 years.  Because of the recidivism rates, the DNA stored on the 
database is essential to matching potential samples to individuals.  Jill Saward, crime 
victim advocate, stated removing all the records from the database would contribute 
to an “ongoing erosion of justice” in the United Kingdom.120  
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Jacqui Smith, UK Home Secretary, stated the government’s proposed measures 
would guarantee those should remain on the database would, while establishing a 
time for removal for those who should be removed.121  Not all government officials 
agreed with the government’s proposal.  Chris Gayling, shadow home secretary, 
stated the government should adopt the Scottish model, which had been praised by 
the European Court of Human Rights.  Gayling said, “People in Britain should be 
innocent until proven guilty.”122  Gayling went on to allege the ministers were trying 
to do as little as possible and the new measures were “just not good enough.”123  
Government Democrats and liberals think DNA should be taken upon arrest but if 
the person is cleared the information should not be retained at all.124  For now, the 
current policies will remain in effect.  
Austria  
Austria established its DNA database in 1997.  At the time of the 2008 
Interpol survey, the database contained 32,000 crime scene profiles, 117,150 
individual profiles, 103 missing person profiles, and 61 profiles from unknown or 
deceased persons.  The database is run by the Ministry of the Interior.   In Austria, 
DNA is taken only from convicted offenders and persons suspected of serious 
offenses.  Profiles may be deleted and samples destroyed upon acquittal, but only on 
written application.125   
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Belgium 
 In Belgium, DNA is taken without suspects’ consent when the person is 
suspected of committing a crime with a prison sentence of five or more years.  DNA 
can also be taken without permission upon order of a magistrate, based on crime 
scene evidence.  DNA profiles of individuals convicted of serious offenses (mostly 
rape and murder) are retained indefinitely on the database.  However, all physical 
DNA samples must be destroyed once profiles are obtained.   At the time of the 2008 
Interpol survey, the Belgium database contained 14,000 crime scene profiles and 
14,000 individual profiles.126   
Bulgaria  
 The Bulgarian DNA database was established in 1999.   Police may take DNA 
from suspects in criminal cases, for crime prevention, or from persons who are a 
threat to national security.  Profiles taken for national security reasons or crime 
prevention must be erased if there is no reason for retaining the information.  The 
Ministry of the Interior determines whether or not a profile should be retained or 
deleted.  In determining retention, the Ministry considers the age of the information, 
the need for the information for the completion of an ongoing investigation, whether 
the person has a prior conviction, or the expiration of the term for retention as 
provided by law.  Profiles taken for reasons other than for crime prevention may 
only be deleted upon written order of the Data Commissioner or upon a written 
request from the individual.  Additionally, to be deleted, the profile must have either 
been registered unlawfully, the individual was acquitted, the individual is exempt 
because of incapacity, or the person is deceased.  At the time of the 2008 Interpol 
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survey, the Bulgarian database contained 940 crime scene profiles, 16,100 
individual profiles, and 15 profiles from unknown/deceased persons.127   
Cyprus  
 The Cyprus DNA database was established in 1998.  Cyprus has new 
legislation planned, but the database is currently operating under the Police Law 
and Protection of Personal Data Act.  The Cyprus Police Headquarters, the 
Laboratory of Forensic Genetics, and the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics 
operate and maintain the DNA database.   Police may only obtain a DNA sample 
from a suspect upon a written court order.  If the court does not issue an order then 
the police need the suspect’s written permission.  Convicted persons’ profiles are 
retained indefinitely unless their record is expunged.  Suspects’ profiles are 
removed upon acquittal or upon clearance of charges.  Crime scene stains are 
retained until identified.  In 2008, Cyprus reported to the Interpol survey 1300 
crime scene profiles, 520 individual profiles, 1590 missing persons’ profiles, and five 
profiles from unknown or deceased individuals.128   
Denmark  
 Denmark created its DNA database in 2000 under the Law Establishing a 
Central DNA Profile Register.  Under the law, police can take samples from a 
convicted person, a suspect charged with a crime that could lead to a prison term of 
one and a half years or more, and all crime scene stains.  After the Court’s decision in 
Marper, Denmark amended its DNA retention policies.  After the ruling, innocent 
persons’ profiles, samples, and fingerprints may be retained for 10 years after an 
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acquittal.  Convicted persons’ and suspects’ profiles are retained until two years 
after death or upon turning 80 years old.129    
Finland 
 Finland established its DNA database in 1999 pursuant to the Coercive 
Measures Act, the Police Act, and the Police Personal Data File Act.  The law 
authorizes DNA collection from persons serving a prison sentence of three or more 
years, suspects charged with a crime that has a potential prison sentence of six 
months or more, and all crime scene stains.  Convicted persons’ profiles are retained 
for 10 years after death.  Suspects’ profiles are removed within one year of the 
prosecutor’s determination there is no evidence, charges are dismissed, the 
sentence is nullified, or 10 years after the suspect’s death (if the information was not 
removed earlier).  Crime scene profiles are retained indefinitely.  At the time of 
Interpol’s 2008 survey, Finland’s database contained 63,030 individual profiles and 
9517 crime scene profiles. 130  
Germany  
 In 1998, the German DNA database was established under the Rules of Legal 
Procedure, the Act for the Establishment of Identity, and the Act for the Federal 
Criminal Investigation Office.  At the time of Interpol’s 2008 survey, there were 
132,252 crime scene profiles, 571,250 individual profiles, 972 missing person 
profiles, and 438 profiles from unknown or deceased persons on the database.131   
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Pursuant to the laws, DNA is collected from people convicted of a serious 
offense, people repeatedly committing the same minor offenses, suspects charged 
with a serious offense, and crime scene stains related to any recordable offense.   
The samples may be taken without the suspect’s consent when the sample is 
necessary for an investigation and when the government has approval from a judge.  
If the delay caused by waiting for a judicial order would damage the investigation, 
the public prosecutor may issue the collection order.  A judge may only order 
coercive sampling from a convicted person when the person is convicted of a 
serious or sexual offense and it is likely the person will recommit.  Persons who 
repeatedly commit the same offenses are treated as having committed a serious 
offense.  If the convicted person does not fit into the above categories, the person 
needs to give consent before DNA may be taken.  Under the law, police are 
authorized to take samples from third party witnesses without consent if taking a 
sample is deemed necessary for establishing the truth.132   
 Convicted persons’ and suspects’ profiles must be removed from the 
database when retention is no longer necessary.  German law sets time frames in 
which the government must decide whether retention of profiles is necessary.  For 
convicted adults, the government must decide whether retention is necessary 
within 10 years of sentencing; for minors, the government must decide within 5 
years of sentencing.  Crime scene profiles are deleted 30 years after their entry.  
Unidentified profiles must be removed after 30 years as well, although most are 
deleted after 10 years.  Convicted persons’ and suspects’ physical samples must be 
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destroyed when they are no longer useful for investigation.  Only unidentified DNA 
samples can be retained for further purposes.133 
 
North and East Africa and the Middle East  
Many countries in Northern and Eastern Africa and the Middle East have already 
established DNA databases.  Currently, there are active national databases in 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Emirates.134  The policies and legislation behind the establishment of 
these nations’ databases vary.  For example, Israel may enact legislation to create a 
DNA database for missing persons and the United Arab Emirates is attempting to 
profile its entire population.  
A the time of Interpol’s 2008 survey, Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and 
Syria had initiated plans for establishing DNA profiles.  According to Gene Watch UK, 
no further information is available, possibly due to last year’s unrest in these 
regions.135 
China   
The Chinese database was established in 2004.  Currently, China has the third 
largest DNA database in the world, although only a small portion of the population is 
profiled and stored.136  According to the 2008 Interpol survey, 126,000 crime scene 
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DNA profiles, 1,065,000 individual profiles, and 9600 unknown/deceased profiles 
were stored on the Chinese database.  Hong Kong had its own separate database 
since 200, using the US CODIS system (4,161 crime scene profiles and 16,235 
individual profiles).137 
The Chinese system does not operate like many of the other national databases 
in the world.  The Chinese government targets certain segments of the population 
and then collects their DNA; DNA collection is not limited to those arrested or 
convicted of criminal offenses.  In August of 2009 police in southern China began 
collecting and maintaining DNA records of employees working in nightclubs, bars 
and KTVs.  According to a report by the Yangcheng Evening News, in order to keep 
their jobs, all employees in the entertainment industry would need a certificate 
showing they had their DNA, fingerprints, and handwriting collected by police.  Long 
Shijun, deputy director of a police station in Guangzhou said the police were 
collecting and marinating this information to assist in monitoring entertainment 
venues, considered to be “hotbeds” of crime.  Critics complained the policy proved a 
longstanding prejudice against people connected with the nighttime entertainment 
industry along with violating the legal principle of innocent until proven guilty.138 
Canada 
On December 10, 1998 the Canadian government accepted the DNA 
Identification Act after years of pressure from the Canadian police community.  The 
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Act amended the Canadian Criminal Code to allow judges to order people convicted 
of certain offenses to provide blood, buccal, or hair samples.  In addition, the law 
created a national DNA database where convicts’ DNA profiles, derived from the 
physical samples, would be stored.  The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness would be responsible for establishing the database.  The law went 
into effect on June 30, 2000.139 
 The official purpose of the Act is to “establish a national DNA data bank to 
help law enforcement agencies identify persons alleged to have committed 
designated offenses, including those committed before the coming into force of this 
Act.”  The statute states that both the “protection of society and the administration 
of justice are well-served by the early detection, arrest and conviction of offenders, 
which can be facilitated by the use of DNA profiles.”  The Act clearly stipulates that 
in order to protect individuals’ privacy, DNA samples and profiles may only be used 
for law enforcement purposes and that safeguards must be placed on the use of DNA 
information along with access to the samples and data bank.140   
 Under Canadian law, the profiles of convicted persons are to be retained 
indefinitely.  However, the Act states that DNA samples and profiles are to be 
destroyed and removed “without delay” if a person is acquitted of the offense for 
which DNA was collected.141     
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III. Comparison and Recommendations  
Comparison of Compulsory DNA Collection 
  
 Most of the countries with DNA databases permit the compulsory collection 
of DNA upon the arrest of a suspect pursuant to the national DNA laws.  For 
example, in the United States and United Kingdom, upon arrest law enforcement is 
authorized to take a DNA sample, generate a profile, and enter the profile into that 
country’s national DNA database.  Germany has a slightly stricter policy: German 
law requires a judicial order for a coerced sample, or, at the very least, authorization 
from the local prosecutor.  Canada and Italy permit DNA samples to be taken only 
from convicted persons.     
 Compulsory DNA collection upon arrest has been most notably challenged in 
the United States as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  However, no court to date has held the DNA 
law to be unconstitutional.  Even the European Court of Human Rights did not find 
that the UK’s collection law violated Article 8 of the Convention for Human Rights.   
 Currently the United States Supreme Court is considering the 
constitutionality of Maryland’s DNA collection law as applied to arrestees.142  The 
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled the compulsory collection of suspects’ and 
arrestees’ DNA is unconstitutional.143  Most likely, the US Supreme Court will agree 
with the Circuit Courts who have addressed the constitutionality of the federal DNA 
                                                        
142 Maryland v. King, 12-207, 2012 WL 3528106 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) 
143 King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 549 (2012), reconsideration denied (May 18, 
2012), cert. granted, 12-207, 2012 WL 3528106 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) 
 37 
Act, and agree that compulsory collection of DNA at the time of arrest is 
constitutional and not an unreasonable search or seizure.  
Opinion and Recommendations for DNA Collection Policies in the US  
  
 I do not think law enforcement should be permitted to take DNA upon arrest.  
This policy bypasses the Amendment’s protections and puts innocent civilians at 
risk for profiling. 
 First, the primary justification given for DNA collection upon arrest is 
identification.144  However, as the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in the King 
decision, once the suspect is identified through the routine booking and fingerprint 
process, the government no longer needs the DNA for identification.145  In fact, the 
court adamantly stated “solving cold cases” was the only State interest served by the 
collection of King’s DNA.146  This means the DNA collection was a warrantless, 
suspicionless search conducted only for the “generalized interest” in solving crime.  
The United States Constitution and the Supreme Court mandate that “a warrantless, 
suspicionless search cannot be upheld by a ‘generalized interest’ in solving 
crimes.”147  Therefore, taking s suspect’s DNA upon his arrest when that DNA is not 
needed to accurately identify him is a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, compulsory collection pursuant to the federal DNA Act or state DNA 
laws is not the only way for law enforcement to obtain DNA samples and profiles.  
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Law enforcement can obtain a special DNA search warrant to obtain a DNA sample 
from a suspect.148  The search warrant requires a showing of probable cause that 
the DNA sample will aid in the investigation (usually by connecting the suspect to 
the crime or by eliminating the person as a suspect).  The warrant requirement 
upholds the values of the Fourth Amendment and ensures that law enforcement 
does not bypass the Constitution.149   
Congress and courts have permitted police officers and prosecutors to 
bypass the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment by enacting and 
upholding the compulsory collection section of the DNA Act.  The probable cause 
that forms the basis of the arrest is not always the same probable cause that justifies 
the taking of the DNA sample.150  If officers had to obtain a DNA search warrant, they 
would need to establish probable cause that DNA will link the individual to the 
crime or be useful in the investigation for the crime the individual was arrested for.   
For example, in King, the police did not collect King’s DNA for the assault 
charge; it was collected pursuant to the Maryland law.  The DNA was therefore not 
collected pursuant to the probable cause of the arrest but was taken only on the 
authority of the statute.  The Maryland Court of Appeals stated, “Establishing 
probable cause to arrest a person is not, by itself, sufficient to permit a biological 
specimen to be taken from the person without first obtaining a search warrant.”  I 
agree.  In my opinion, if police officers applied for a search warrant to obtain a DNA 
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sample from King for the assault charge they would not have met the probable cause 
requirement (especially since officers had already accurately identified King).  The 
compulsory collection laws permit law enforcement to bypass the probable cause 
requirement when they collect DNA without a warrant because the probable cause 
for the arrest is not the same probable cause required to take the sample.  
  In my opinion, the biggest problem with permitting law enforcement to 
obtain a DNA sample from an arrestee without a warrant is the potential for 
profiling and abuse.  Under the current law, a police officer could arrest someone 
who he considers “suspicious” for a minor felony offense as a pretext for obtaining a 
DNA sample, with the hope of running the profile through CODIS and connecting the 
arrestee to a different crime that there is no other strong evidence for.  While this is 
definitely efficient, it is not constitutional and runs afoul of the entire adversarial 
system.  Police and prosecutors are required to investigate and gather evidence 
pursuant to the protections put in place by the Constitution.  
 I recognize that popular opinion and case law are against me.  The use of 
DNA for identification purposes has ensured that DNA collection upon arrest will 
continue in the United States.  Additionally, courts have continuously bypassed the 
probable cause issue by finding that DNA profiling is only for identification, even 
though other courts, such as the House of Lords in the Marper case, and the 
Maryland Court of Appeals in King clearly noted stored DNA information is useful 
for the prevention of future crimes.151     
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Comparison of DNA Profile Retention 
  
 DNA profile retention policies vary around the world.  Prior to the Marper 
decision, the United Kingdom had the broadest retention policy for non-convicted 
persons: DNA profiles from arrestees and suspects were retained indefinitely.  The 
UK began the process of changing its retention policy when the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled (in Marper) the UK policy violated Article 8.   
Other countries have stricter policies.  Prior to Marper, Denmark had a broad 
retention policy.  However, after the decision, Denmark amended its policy.  
Currently, innocent persons’ profiles may be retained for 10 years after their 
acquittal or clearance of charges; after 10 years the records must be removed.152  
Austria permits profiles to be deleted and samples to be destroyed upon acquittal if 
written application is made.153  Cyprus permits convicted persons’ profiles to be 
retained indefinitely but requires suspects’ profiles be removed upon acquittal or 
clearance of the charges.  The overall theme is that arrestees’ samples cannot be 
retained indefinitely if they are never prosecuted and convicted of a crime.   
The United States follows this approach.  Convicted persons’ profiles are 
retained indefinitely but arrestees’ profiles must be removed if charges are not 
pursued or if there is an acquittal.  However, in the US the cleared person is 
responsible for submitting a written request that his profile be deleted along with 
proof that charges were dropped or he was acquitted.  
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Opinion and Recommendations for DNA Retention Policies in the US  
   
 In my opinion, in this area of DNA retention, Scotland has achieved the 
correct balance.  When charges are not pursued or a person is acquitted it is the 
responsibility of the government to remove the arrested person’s DNA profile and 
sample.  This approach adequately serves law enforcement’s interest in identifying 
individuals upon arrest and using DNA to investigate crimes while protecting the 
privacy of innocent persons.   
Convicted persons have a lesser expectation of privacy in their identity and 
therefore convicted persons give up rights upon their conviction.154  Subsequently, 
retaining DNA profiles of convicted persons is in line with the Fourth Amendment.   
 An arrestee, on the other hand, is in a different category than a convicted 
person.  An arrestee, through his arrest, does have a diminished expectation of 
privacy in his identity than someone who is not under arrest and identification is 
the main justification for taking a DNA sample upon arrest.155  Additionally, the 
government has a legitimate interest in having an accurate and efficient tool (DNA) 
for investigating a crime.  
However, once the person is accurately identified, if charges are later 
dropped or the person is acquitted of the charges, his status returns to that of a full 
citizen who has every expectation of privacy in his identity.  Retaining DNA profiles 
of individuals when charges have been dropped or there has been an acquittal is a 
clear violation of the Fourth Amendment and an intrusion into a person’s 
                                                        
154 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987); United 
States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) 
155 Id.  
 42 
expectation of privacy in his identity.  Furthermore, “the State interest in 
supervision and prevention of recidivism are much diminished, if not absent, in the 
context of arrestees and pretrial detainees.”156   
  Retaining DNA of persons who have not been convicted also violates the 
presumption of innocence surrounding arrestees.157  The government interest in 
storing DNA of persons who have not been convicted of a crime is not close to 
sufficient to overcome this historical and traditional presumption.  Retaining DNA of 
an innocent persons stains that person’s presumption for any future arrest because 
immediately law enforcement has access to his profile and knows he was previously 
arrested.     
Take Denmark as an example.  Denmark’s policy of retaining innocent 
persons’ profiles for 10 years after acquittal or after charges have been dropped is a 
violation of the innocent person’s rights.  Once the person is cleared, his life prior to 
his arrest should be returned to him.  Retaining his DNA profile has changed his 
status under the law because now he is in a different position than a person who has 
never been convicted of a crime.  His arrest, which never resulted in a conviction 
and could have been the result of any number of factors (mistake, illegal racial 
profiling), has now, in my opinion, impermissibly affected his future and changed his 
identification status.  All non-convicted persons should be equal in their legal status, 
but an arrestee’s status is no longer equal and the arrest follows him into his future 
(10 years into his future in the case of Denmark).  
                                                        
156 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 415 n. 25 (quoting United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 
(9th Cir.2006) 
157 King v. State, Supra  
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 The United States has almost achieved the correct balance.  However, I think 
that requiring an innocent person to submit a written request and proof of his 
innocence places too high a burden on that person.  Once the person is cleared or 
charges are not pursued, the burden should be on the government, who arrested, 
charged, or convicted the person in the first place, to then set the record straight.  
All too often a person who is less educated or more poorly represented will not be 
aware that his DNA will be indefinitely retained unless he submits evidence of his 
clearance or acquittal and requests the deletion of his DNA profile.  This has the 
potential to open the door to Due Process and Equal Protection Claims.   
The bottom line is the person has been declared innocent, but because his 
records are retained, he is no longer on equal footing before the law as another 
innocent person has never been arrested.  Arrests, without conviction, should not 
alter a person’s status, disturb the presumption of innocence, and follow a person 
into his future.    
FINAL CONCLUSION 
 DNA profiling is here to stay.  Using DNA for identification and investigation 
in criminal matters is useful in solving crime but has serious implications on a 
person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.  The best scenario would be to 
require a search warrant based on probable cause to obtain a DNA sample.  If the 
person is convicted, his DNA profile should remain on the national database 
indefinitely.  If charges are not pursued or the person is later acquitted, the burden 
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should be on the government to immediately remove the profile and destroy the 
sample.  This policy achieves the correct balance between the government’s 
legitimate interests in identification and investigation and an individual’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment.   
 
